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India and China have a long and ambivalent relationship that has often 
been described in contradicting terms ranging from conflict and con-
tainment to competition and cooperation.2 The Doklam incident in 
summer 2017 has underlined again that the unresolved border issue 
continues to be a constant source of bilateral tensions. China’s close 
relations with Pakistan, the expansion of China’s naval power in the 
Indian Ocean and India’s intensified both bi- and multilateral cooper-
ation with Japan, the United States and Australia in the context of the 
Quadrilateral Dialogue (Quad) are part of the mutual efforts of balanc-
ing and competition that both countries are pursuing in the wider Indo-
Pacific region. But it should not be overlooked that both countries have 
established new forms of cooperation in recent years. Economically, 
China is India’s largest trading partner. Politically, both countries are 
members of the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).  
India is among the few countries in Asia which has from the 
beginning refused to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
India is also the only country which has justified its opposition against 
the BRI with the violation of its national sovereignty. The China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is the flagship project of the 
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BRI runs through the Pakistan controlled part of Jammu and Kashmir 
which is claimed by India since the accession of the former princely 
state in October 1947. But Indian policy makers have also voiced their 
concerns over the rising debt of countries that joined the BRI and the 
lack of transparency of many BRI projects. There is a strong consensus 
in India in the opposition against the BRI.3 Compared to this there are 
only very few voices which promote at least a partial participation of 
India in the BRI.4 
But India’s relationship with the Belt and Road Initiative is more 
complex and includes a variety of dilemmas and challenges on the 
national, regional, and global level. The argument is, that even if India 
continues to reject this project it may be slowly drawn into its net-
works that are permeating neighbouring countries. The first part of the 
paper tries to identify some of these dilemmas and challenges on the 
different levels, the second part will look at India’s new strategies and 
initiatives that came up as a reaction to the BRI.  
The national level: security vs. development  
The Indian discourse on China is shaped by two diverging positions. On 
the one hand, China is India’s largest bilateral trading partner, on the 
other hand China is also seen as India’s main strategic challenge. The 
most important controversial issue is the unresolved border question. 
India’s humiliating defeat in the border war of 1962 continues to shape 
the conversations in India’s strategic community. The territorial conflict 
encompasses Indian demands for the Aksai Chin region in Kashmir 
whereas China claims the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as South 
Tibet. China protests regularly against the visits of high ranking Indian 
politicians to this region and has repeatedly refused visa for Indians 
from Arunachal Pradesh.5 Moreover, the activities of the Dalai Lama in 
India pose an important bilateral security issue for China. Since his 
flight from Tibet in 1959 the Dalai Lama and large parts of the 150,000 
strong Tibetan diaspora are staying in India. 
After their rapprochement in the late 1980s, both sides set up a 
joint working group (JWG) on the border issue which has held 21 
meetings until 2018.6 Moreover, both sides signed various agreements 
in order to strengthen the status quo on the un-demarcated border. 
But border incursions like Doklam in 2017 have always marred the 
bilateral relationship. India viewed the construction of Chinese roads in 
this area as a strategic challenge to the Siliguri corridor, which is 
India’s only land connection to its states in the Northeast. The crisis 
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could be solved diplomatically and started off a new phase of collabo-
ration after the informal Wuhan summit in April 2018. 
Rapprochement since the early 1990s has also intensified the 
economic cooperation between the two Asian giants. Despite sporadic 
tensions and India’s opposition against BRI, Chinese companies see 
India as an attractive market mainly because of its size and lower 
wages. So it is not astonishing that Chinese investment in India has 
increased over the years. In 2017, official Chinese investment reached 
nearly 2 billion US dollars; a significant increase compared to 2016 
with 700 million US dollars.7  
The real figures are probably even higher because those numbers 
only include investments from mainland China. But Chinese investment 
via Hong Kong, Macao or via third countries like Singapore or Mauritius 
is not included in the official statistics. Moreover, investments that are 
generated from profits of Chinese companies within India are also not 
included in the official data.8 Therefore it is not astonishing to see 
estimates that Chinese companies have already invested more than 8 
billion US dollars in India up until 2017.9 
In recent years Chinese companies have invested especially in 
India’s growing start-up scene. Companies like Alibaba and Tencent 
have invested in Indian Online companies like Snapdeal and Paytm.10 
Chinese smartphone companies like Xiaomi, Huawei and Oppo have set 
up manufacturing units in India and have increased their share in the 
fast growing Indian market. India has also attracted Chinese invest-
ments in research and development. Huawei’s Bengaluru centre is its 
largest R&D facility outside China and has recently announced 
development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) capabilities in India.11 
Trade has reached more than 80 billion US dollars in 2017 and has 
increased by more than 20 per cent compared to the previous year, 
despite the Doklam incident. At the same time there is a massive trade 
imbalance and India has its largest trade deficit with China with more 
than 51 billion US dollars in 2017.12 India’s exports are mainly raw 
materials, China’s main exports to India are electric machinery. As part 
of their rapprochement after Doklam, both countries agreed on tariff 
reductions in summer 2018 in order to promote economic collabora-
tion. Moreover, both countries are in negotiations for the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). This free trade area will 
encompass 16 countries in the Asia-Pacific which represent around 30 
per cent of global trade.13 
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There seems to be an obvious complementary relationship between 
the BRI, a sino-centric trade and transportation network with Chinese 
infrastructure investments on the one hand, and India’s desire to 
attract financing and promote export-oriented manufacturing. The 
Modi government has initiated a large scale "Make in India" program in 
order to increase manufacturing by decreasing barriers to foreign 
investment among other measures. There were hopes that large scale 
manufacturing companies would relocate some of their production sites 
to India after the increase of wages in China. Hence India’s dilemma 
on the national level is, that its rejection of the BRI imposes large 
opportunity costs for its own development. The public discourse in 
India is more dominated by the "China threat" rather than by the 
"China opportunity". But this dilemma seems to be temporarily 
manageable because of India’s high growth rates and its attractiveness 
to foreign direct investment.  
The regional context: changing dynamics in South Asia  
It would be mistaken to argue that India lost its influence in South Asia 
because of the BRI which was officially launched in 2013. China had 
already invested in the region and had expanded its ties with India’s 
neighbours long before 2013. These neighbours have always tried to 
play the China card much before the BRI in order to balance India’s 
influence. India's neighbours have regarded China as an attractive 
partner because when compared with India it is politically neutral for 
them, i.e. they hardly have any major bilateral problems, and it has 
been economically more attractive.14 This constellation has been 
supportive for China to enter South Asia. Hence, the BRI seems to 
have accelerated a process which has set in long before.  
India is facing two different kinds of dilemmas regarding the BRI in 
South Asia, one linked to Kashmir, the other with its own efforts to 
promote connectivity in the region. First, the BRI may have the 
potential to also transform the relations between India and Pakistan 
and their lingering conflict over Kashmir. With the BRI, it appears that 
China has turned into a status quo power in the Kashmir issue, a 
position that is neither shared by India nor by Pakistan. Officially, 
China is not part of the Kashmir dispute. It is not mentioned in the 
resolution of the United Nations (UN) although it controls the Aksai 
Chin area of the former princely state which is claimed by India. But 
with its massive investment of 60 billion US dollars in the CPEC, it is 
difficult to imagine that China, as a veto power in the UN Security 
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Council, would have an interest in changing the present constellation in 
Kashmir. So the Chinese investment in the region can also be seen as 
an affirmation of the status quo between India and Pakistan.  
India’s official position is that the whole princely state of Jammu and 
Kashmir acceded to the Union in October 1947. The presence of 
Pakistani troops in this area and the construction of roads and infra-
structure by China especially in Gilgit-Baltistan are regarded as a 
breach of India’s sovereignty. Already in 1963, India has protested 
against the China Pakistan border agreement in which Pakistan gave 
parts of Kashmir under its control to China. Chinese investment in this 
region is not a new phenomenon. The Karakorum Highway (KKH) 
between China and Pakistan was already completed in the late 1970s. 
In order to make CPEC an economically viable project it will be neces-
sary to improve the KKH so that is can be used year-round.  
But India has also shown flexibility on Kashmir in its negotiations 
with Pakistan. In the negotiations with Pakistan during the composite 
dialogue after 2004, both sides reached an informal understanding in 
2007 which would de facto have implied an acceptance of the 
territorial status quo by India. Although this solution was never made 
public it was later confirmed by Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf, 
his Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri and the Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh.15  
China’s status quo approach may also explain the proposals of the 
Chinese ambassador to India in 2017 when he declared that China 
could rename CPEC if India was willing the join the One Belt One Road 
initiative (OBOR).16 He also offered to 'create an alternative corridor 
through Jammu & Kashmir, Nathu La Pass or Nepal to deal with India’s 
concerns'17. But Prime Minister Modi has strengthened India’s trade-
tional position on Kashmir with his remarks on Independence Day 
2016 on Gilgit-Baltistan. India’s dilemma is that the BRI works in 
direction of a status quo that is not shared by the present government 
of the BJP. 
It is not without a certain irony that China’s status quo approach in 
Kashmir is a much bigger challenge for Pakistan, Beijing’s long-time 
ally. Pakistan is also facing at least two challenges. First, Pakistan 
official position on Kashmir argues that the whole territory of the 
former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory 
according to the resolutions of the United Nations (UN). Pakistan has 
used and triggered regional crises, like the Kargil War in 1999, to 
enforce an engagement of the international community in the conflict. 
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China did not support Pakistan in the Kargil crisis long before the BRI. 
This raises the question of how far China would be willing to support 
similar strategies of Pakistan in the future but now with an investment 
of 60 billion US dollars in CPEC which might be endangered by another 
military confrontation between India and Pakistan. Moreover, would 
China really have an interest to internationalize the dispute, like Paki-
stan wants, which may even lead to a referendum in which the Kash-
miris may for instance opt with a probability of 50 per cent to stay with 
India?  
Second, the BRI has raised great hopes in all of Pakistan’s provinces 
for better infrastructure and development. This has also increased the 
aspirations in Gilgit-Baltistan, a part of Kashmir that is administered by 
Pakistan, where there are growing demands for a full provincial status 
in order to benefit from the BRI programs.18 But giving Gilgit-Baltistan 
the status of a full province would severely undermine Pakistan’s long-
standing position on Kashmir. If the region would become a full 
province it will be difficult to uphold the demand that the whole area is 
a disputed territory. So the reforms of Pakistani governments are 
always a tightrope walk in giving more autonomy without granting a 
full constitutional status. The new government of Prime Minister Imran 
Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) has introduced a large 
reform package for a provisional provincial status of Gilgit-Baltistan.19 
The major challenge for Pakistan will be how to achieve a de-facto 
integration of the region into the constitution without changing its de-
jure status in order to avoid repercussions on the country’s official 
Kashmir position. The BRI may therefore, intentionally or not, 
contribute to an attenuation of Pakistan’s position on Kashmir. This 
may diminish the risk of another Kargil-like crisis, which was directly 
undertaken by the Pakistan military.  
But unfortunately this constellation will not stop terrorist attacks 
from militant groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) or Jaish-e-Mohammed 
(JeM) which may have the potential to trigger another bilateral crisis 
between Pakistan and India like in 2001/2002 after the failed attack on 
the Indian parliament. Pakistan’s growing dependence from China may 
also make the militant groups feel encouraged to continue or even 
expand their activities. Moreover, if CPEC will really strengthen Paki-
stan’s economic development, this may lead to higher expenditure for 
the military. This may also fuel the arms race in the region in the long 
term perspective.  
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But India is facing another dilemma with the Chinese investment in 
South Asia. It is often forgotten that Indian governments have also 
tried to increase connectivity in South Asia. Since the 1990s India 
changed its policy towards South Asia emphasizing with the Gujral 
doctrine the principle of non-reciprocity in conflicts with its neighbours. 
This marked a stark contrast to the Indira doctrine that led to various 
Indian interventions in South Asia in the 1970s and 1980s. Especially 
after 2004, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government of Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh put a great emphasis on regional connec-
tivity both bilaterally and in the context of the South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).20 But India lacked the great 
narrative on regional connectivity that is so successfully projected by 
China. Moreover, India’s attempts have not be successful with regard 
to the promotion of intra-regional trade which was still only about six 
per cent in 2015 making South Asia economically the least integrated 
region.21  
India’s opposition to the BRI has also hampered its own connectivity 
projects, with the Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar (BCIM) corridor 
being the most prominent "victim". BCIM developed from the Kunming 
Initiative which the four states started in the late 1990s in order to 
increase regional connectivity. In 2013 the Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh and the Chinese Prime minister Li Keqiang discussed 
the project during their bilateral meeting. But after China integrated 
the BCIM into the BRI framework, India reduced its initiative in 
promoting the project.22  
If Chinese investments in South Asia are simply extrapolated and 
even if only half of the investments will finally materialize, India will be 
encircled not only by a "String of Pearls" but by Chinese logistics, 
energy, and communication networks.23 As India will continue its own 
efforts for trade and investment in the region, the dilemma is that 
India cannot escape the BRI. It will be drawn most probably into the 
existing BRI networks in the neighbouring countries. This will become 
a challenge for Indian companies because the overwhelming Chinese 
investment may also shape the industrial norms and technological 
standards in the neighbouring countries in the mid- to long-term 
perspective. 
Moreover China has made it clear that the BRI is not an exclusive 
project but a complementary project that aims to integrate with other 
connectivity projects like the International North South Transport 
Corridor (INSTC) which is promoted by Iran, India, and Russia.24 The 
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Iranian government which has traditionally good relations with India 
has already signalled its interest to include neighbouring countries like 
Pakistan in the project.25 Even if India refuses to link its connectivity 
projects with China, the neighbouring countries may do so. The 
division of Chinese and Indian connectivity projects may continue on 
paper but it is difficult to imagine that these divisions will continue 
once the projects are implemented. It is more likely to see a slow but 
steady merging of Chinese and Indian projects in various parts of 
South Asia.  
The global arena  
On the global level the different forms of collaboration between India 
and China overlay the controversial issues. India has for a long time 
shown great interest in intensifying global cooperation with China. In 
the 1950s, India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wanted closer ties 
with China in order to strengthen Asia’s role in global politics. In his 
efforts to bring China back into the international system, Nehru even 
refused offers in the 1950s to make India a permanent member of the 
Security Council of the United Nations.26  
Since their rapprochement in the late 1980s both states have 
intensified their global cooperation and have often shared common 
position in global governance negotiations. Together with Brazil, 
Russia, and South Africa they formed the BRICS group which articu-
lated the new self-confidence of the emerging powers. The BRICS have 
set up their own set of institutions, for instance a think tank council 
and the New Development Bank (NDB) which was first headed by an 
Indian. China and India were part of the BASIC group which, together 
with Brazil and South Africa, committed to cooperate at international 
climate conferences. In 2018, India (and Pakistan) became members 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in which China and 
Russia are the most important players. India has also supported the 
creation of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 
With more than 1.2 Billion US dollars for various infrastructure projects 
India became the largest borrower of the AIIB so far.27 Because of 
China’s dominant role in the AIIB, India cannot secure funds for 
infrastructure projects in Arunachal Pradesh, which is claimed by China 
(see above).  
There are also at least two main controversial issues in the global 
arena between India and China. First, although China has agreed to 
the civilian nuclear agreement between the United States and India in 
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2008, Beijing is blocking India’s entry into the Nuclear Supplier’s Group 
(NSG).28 Secondly, China refuses to designate Masood Azhar, the head 
of the militant group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) which is responsible for 
various attacks in India as a global terrorist in the United Nations.29 In 
both cases China seems to protect the interests of Pakistan. 
India’s entry into the BRI could eventually also help to increase the 
bilateral cooperation in the global arena. But the BRI is a Chinese 
project which is also perceived by the international community as 
such. The BRI is a "Chinese brand" in which there may be room for 
"win-win" constellations but not for equality between China and other 
partners. States that join the BRI are therefore perceived only as 
"junior partners" of China in the project. This is in stark contrast to the 
perspective of Indian policy makers who see their country on par with 
China despite their economic and political differences. The perception 
that India would be regarded as a "junior partner" in the BRI is not 
acceptable for decision makers in New Delhi. Therefore, Beijing’s 
efforts to woo India to join the BRI are likely to remain fruitless.  
But India’s opposition towards the BRI should not be mistaken as a 
general opposition to cooperation with China. On the contrary: At their 
informal Wuhan summit in April 2018, Prime Minister Modi and 
President Xi put their bilateral relations on a broader collaborative 
foundation after the stand-off in Doklam 2017.30 One outcome was the 
agreement to cooperate jointly in Afghanistan in the training of 
diplomats.31 Modi’s speech at the Shangri-La dialogue in June 2018 
where he made it clear that the Indo-Pacific is an inclusive concept 
that is not directed against other countries was also a clear signal of 
rapprochement towards China.32 So, India will not refuse closer 
cooperation with China, but only if there is no BRI stamp on the 
project. This means for China that joint projects with India have to be 
put under a different label, not BRI, which would give India the status 
of an equal partner.  
India’s reaction: new partners, new formats 
Facing China’s growing presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean 
Rim India has reacted with a variety of policies. Of course, India has 
always had its own strategy for South Asia, the Indian Ocean and 
Africa. But China’s massive engagement in these regions has caused 
many concerns in New Delhi. In August 2018 Foreign Secretary V. 
Gokhale declared before the standing committee in parliament, that 
'[t]he Strings of Pearls is real' and that India’s 'renewed stress on 
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connectivity projects was borne out of this perception'33. Hence, it is 
interesting to note that six months later V. K. Singh, Minister of State 
for External Affairs and former army chief, publicly rejected the 
concept of the "String of Pearls" in another conciliatory move towards 
China.34 
The most obvious reaction is that India will increase its efforts to 
promote its own connectivity projects. As already mentioned, India has 
a long tradition of supporting infrastructure projects both in South Asia 
and in Africa. India will focus its efforts on its own connectivity projects 
in the region, for instance the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) 
corridor, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project with Myan-
mar or the various bilateral projects like in Afghanistan, the Chabahar 
port in Iran or the railway system in Sri Lanka.  
What is new is that India now seems to be more inclined to 
cooperate with external powers in third countries both in its neighbour-
hood and other regions. In South Asia, India has started cooperation 
with the United States in Afghanistan and with Japan in Sri Lanka. 
India and Japan have also agreed to establish the Asia Africa Growth 
Corridor (AAGC) which will also cover the Indian Ocean.35 Another 
example is the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) 
in which India cooperates closely with Iran and Russia in order to get 
access to Central Asia. 
The Modi government has also expanded its bilateral military 
cooperation in the Indian Ocean through new agreements with Oman, 
France, and the Seychelles. In the wider geo-strategic space, India has 
welcomed the revitalisation of the Quadrilateral Dialogue ("Quad") 
between the United States, Japan, and Australia. But India also seem 
to be deliberately reluctant first to follow the American interpretation 
of the Indo-Pacific and second to upgrade the Quad format in a way 
that would signal a more controversial stance against China (see 
above).36  
India has also shown a new interest in regional institutions like 
BIMSTEC and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). This can only 
be partly linked to the BRI, but maybe India will appreciate the 
usefulness of stronger regional institutions which may also act as a 
counterweight against mostly bilateral instruments like the BRI.  
India’s more flexible foreign policy may also open up new opportunities 
to intensify the cooperation with the European Union (EU). With its 
new Asia Connectivity Strategy, the EU has widened its foreign policy 
instruments in order to offer alternative connectivity projects with 
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better conditions and more transparency than the BRI. This may foster 
EU-India cooperation not only in South Asia, but also in the Indian 
Ocean and in parts of Africa.  
Prospects: India’s BRI challenges 
There is no reason to believe that India is going to change its position 
vis-à-vis the BRI. But this creates various dilemmas for India. 
Domestically, the non-participation creates opportunity costs. But 
those may be easily compensated for as long as India has robust 
growth rates. The much bigger challenges are on the regional level. 
First, the BRI does not only cement roads in Pakistan and Gilgit-
Baltistan but also a status quo on the Kashmir issue which is not 
necessarily in India’s interest. Moreover, BRI could be regarded as an 
"external interference" in the conflict which has never been accepted 
by India. Second, India will continue its own efforts for better regional 
connectivity. But China will continue to invest on a much larger scale. 
Hence, future connectivity networks in South Asia for instance in the 
telecom or power sector may be defined by Chinese rather than by 
Indian standards. So even if India continues to reject the BRI it may 
be slowly pulled into the BRI through its neighbourhood. On the global 
level, India joining BRI would give a boost to the bilateral colla-
boration. But as long as India will then only be perceived as a junior 
partner of China in the BRI, it is difficult to imagine such a step.  
There are no easy ways out from these different challenges and 
dilemmas for India. The first strategy would be to sit and wait. India is 
not in a position to enter into a competition with China on connectivity. 
Former Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar declared during a 
parliamentary hearing on the Doklam crisis that it would be 'suicidal 
for the Government of India to match port for port and airport for 
airport'. 'That would be a suicidal policy because it would be effectively 
entering into what is the equivalent 1970s arms race between the 
Soviet Union and United States of America.'37 His successor V. Gokhale 
conceded that China’s financial conditions and the fast implementation 
of projects are attractive for many countries.38 But after the initial 
euphoria about the BRI there are more and more countries in which a 
critical reflection on the long term repercussions of Chinese invest-
ments has set in, for instance in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Malaysia. 
This may open new avenues for India for its own connectivity efforts. 
Second, in order to be successful, India has then to be sure that its 
own and joint projects with partners like Japan or the EU have better 
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conditions and offer a higher transparency than the Chinese projects. 
This will also require more investment in the implementation capacity 
on the Indian side. Finally, India has signalled that it is not opposed to 
a closer collaboration with China in general. So another strategy may 
be to look for new formats to expand the bilateral cooperation with 
China under a different format.  
But even if India continues its opposition to the BRI it will become 
more and more difficult for New Delhi to evade it in the mid- to long-
term perspective. Chinese investment into India will continue, the BRI 
infrastructure networks in the neighbourhood may set up new norms 
and standards to which Indian companies have to comply. With its 
different dilemmas and challenges, the BRI will remain an interesting 
test case for India to see in how far the often quoted 'Wuhan spirit'39 
has really marked the beginning of a new phase of cooperation or was 
just an interlude in the long term strategic competition between the 
two Asian giants. 
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